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Introduction 
We all know that there are times and places when a multicultural society with day-to-day 
interactions between the different cultural groups can function peacefully and with 
tolerance. An example, turned both ironic and tragic by political developments, was 
Sarajevo before the present war. It has been described as a tolerant multicultural 
community with no ethnic or cultural clashes between the different groups living there. 
On the other hand we also know that under some circumstances the peace and 
tolerance between different cultural groups is disrupted, with a growing mental distance 
between the groups, lack of trust, hostility, and in some cases political conflict aiming at 
changing the basis of the political system: either in the form of demands for constitutional 
changes in the direction of local or regional self-determination within a federal or 
confederal framework or in the form of demands for secession and the creation of new 
totally independent political units. 
The aim of this paper is to explore the relationship between cultural differences and 
political strife, by trying to delimit and point out some factors which contribute to a 
political system becoming divided along ethnic/cultural lines including a discussion of 
some institutional mechanisms, which are used in order to contain the political conflicts 
of a culturally divided society. 
It might be useful to start by making a distinction between two types of culturally 
based political conflicts: 
a) Conflicts about which cultural traditions or principles that shall be prominent in the 
society, e.g. confessional or not confessional schools. What language shall be the 
official one etc. (=Cultural policy) 
b) Conflicts about the distribution of values in the society - values like wealth, status, 
political influence - between different ethnic/cultural groups, i.e. a distribution based 
upon cultural criteria or rather upon membership of a cultural community. 
It is the relationship between these two conflicts which I would like to expand upon today 
from the conviction that this interplay is important when 'cultural diversity' in the sense 
of different traditions, religions and languages, is being politicized and transformed into 
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political conflict threatening the political cohesion of a multicultural society. My 
discussion to-day is an attempt to make more explicit (at least part of) the logic of the 
politicization of cultural diversity. Thus it is an exercise in political theory and 
construction of a political model. 
When does cultural diversity become the base of political perception and 
organization, e.g. become the base of the political structure? 
The concept of discrimination 
Let us start with the existence of a multi-cuIturaI society, where there are different culturaI 
groups, distinguishable by criteria such as language, religion, ethnic origin and different 
ways of life. The groups or culturaI segments are defined by these 'objective' criteria, i.e. 
it is not the free choice of the individual whether to be a member of the one or the other 
group. 
The number of groups are not important to my argument, as long as they are at least 
two, and not so many and small that they cannot generate some social power base in 
relation to the central government. 
Let us now introduce in this multicultural context an (ideological) principle, which 
we can call the principle of cultural discrimination. I mean by this that a criterion for 
distribution of status, wealth and political influence is used, which is based upon 
membership of different culturaI or ethnic groups. Discrimination are practices, which 
aim to exclude members of a particular group from benefiting from certain valued 
circumstances, be they rights to participate or access to goods and so on. The important 
aspect here is the criterion used for excluding people: their being members of a 
particular ethnic/cultural group. 
One possible objection may be voiced. The crux of the matter is not whether the 
aims of the practices are discriminatory. As long as the result is a de facto 
discrimination, even if unintended, that is enough ground for political mobilization 
along ethnic/cultural lines. In many explanatory models of support for e.g. ethnic-
cultural movements the decisive factor is expressed as 'the perception of relative 
deprivation' of the ethnic region l . I would like to stick to my formulation not in the 
sense that the real aims of the discriminatory practices are vital, but in the sense that the 
R.J.Thompson and J.R.Rudolph, Jr 'The Ebb and Flow of Ethnoterritorial Politics in the 
Western World', in Thompson RJ and J.R.Rudolph, Jr. (eds) Ethnoterrirorial Politics. 
Policy. aruJ the Western World, Lynne Rienner pub!. Boulder and London. 1989, p. 5. 
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perceived aims are an integral part of the definition of discrimination. 
One can here make the distinction between cultural discrimination, on one hand , 
(threats to the group's culture, its possibilities to preserve and develop its culture, its 
own language, its way of living) and political and economic discrimination, on the 
other. In the case of cultural discrimination its 'societal security ', to use a term from 
international politics', is threatened. To the extent that enough members of the 
ethnic/cultural group value their culture, this could naturally be expressed as a common 
group interest. 
But even if the cultural existence or autonomy of the group is not experienced as 
threatened, the interests of the members of the group could be defined in terms of the 
group. This could happen if economic, social and political discrimination was practiced 
against the group. To the extent that members of an ethnic minority group are seeing 
themselves as being discriminated against because they are members of a specific 
ethnic/cultural group, the political mobilization and support potential seems very large. 
The differentiation between cultural, political and economic discrimination is not 
simple or clear-cut. The demands of ethnic/cultural groups may be a combination of 
cultural autonomy and demands for another economic policy.' Depending on the 
political regime and the political responses of the government we may get a circulus 
viliosus, where one fonn of discrimination will be followed by the other fonns as a 
result of efforts by the ethnic/cultural group to change its position. 
Discrimination is nonnally related to a social ideology, which legitimizes the 
discrimination, by arguing for unequal - social and economic and political - treatment 
of one ethnic/cultural group. The arguments can have very different character: they can 
be based upon the contrast between one's own cultural identity and the characteristics 
of the cultural 'alter' as in the case of a racial superiority ideology. They may also 
include threats to the continued existence of one's own cultural identity , and/or a history 
of social, economic and political grievance, caused by the other ethnic/cultural group, 
which is described as hostile and aggressive through history. Thus, unequal treatment 
can be legitimized either by the inferiority of the group and/or by the threaJ it poses for 
2 
J 
Cf. Ole Wrever et aI. , Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, 1993 , 
Ch. 2. 
The experience of Belgium shows the success of ethno-territorial parties to integrate class 
and general economic dissatisfaction into their list of demands. Cf. Rudolph, l .R. 
'Belgium: Variations on the Theme of Territorial Accommodation' , in Rudolph & 
Thompson, 1989, p. 90-113. 
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the discriminating group in terms of economic, social welfare or cultural existence·. 
The acceptance of group-discrimination is furthered by mental distance and the 
perception of cultural distance. The more different you are, the easier it is to build a 
negative stereotype of the other group, which legitimizes unequal treatment. In this 
respect cultural diversity supports or alleviates discrimination. 
Discrimination and the def"mition of political reality 
The practice of social discrimination according to cultural criteria ' has even more 
fundamental implications: it influences how political reality is conceived. 
One traditional and very common way oflooking at the political system, which we 
find expressed in classical political theory, is to see the basic political relationship as one 
between government on one hand and the citizens on the other. This is the liberal 
tradition, beautifully expressed in the concept of a contract between the individuals to 
create a government, or a contract between the individuals on the one hand and the 
government on the other. In modem democratic theory, we have of course both political 
parties and interest organizations as transmission belts between the government and the 
individuals. But still it is the interests of the citizens as individuals which are being 
pursued by the organizations intervening between the individuals and the government. The 
basic political unit in this understanding is the citizen, and the citizen as individual has 
some social and political rights. The implication is of course, that these rights are equally 
distributed, they are not contingent upon membership of a special subgroup of the society. 
fYle all know that sometimes these rights are seen as more formal than real and that these 
rights do not imply an equal distribution of wealth or quality oflife or life-chances and 
so ont 
4 
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Cf. the subtle argument by Norbert Elias on the relations between the superior, 
established group and the outsiders, the target group for discrimination, in his The 
Established and the Oursiders, 1994. 
Renan, according to Ernest Gulnare, singled out the most crucial trait of a nation: the 
anonymity of membership. 'A nation is a large collection of men such that its members 
identify with the collectivity without being acquainted with its other members , and without 
identifying in any important way with sub-groups of that collectivity. Membership is 
generally unmediated by any really significant corporate segments of the total society. 
Sub-groups are fluid and ephemeral and do not compare in importance with the "national" 
community.' Gellner 987:6. 
8 
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, 
The use of cultural criteria for the implementation of discriminatory practices 
implies" the construction of another kind of 'political reality', by which I mean the basic 
way to perceive and conceptualize political life: the basic political units and the 
fundamental relationships between them'. 
The basic social units will be the cultural/ethnic groups, not individuals. To these 
groups as collective units are accorded or withdrawn rights. There is thus an (explicit 
or implicit) recognition of the ethnic/cultural groups as the base for allocation of 
social, economic and political resources. 
In this situation the individual is defined by his group membership. His wealth, 
status or influence is determined by his membership of an ethnic/cultural group. His 
possibilities to advance his material or non-material situation as an individual and 
apart from his ethnic/cultural community are smail or non-existing and under all 
circumstances imply giving up central cultural values such as religion, language, way 
of life etc. 
If the ethnic/cultural group is the unit to be awarded or deprived of rights it 
becomes important to mobilize and organize the group in order to change the situation 
of discrimination. 
As the ethnic/cultural organization is the agent of collective action it is important 
to make use of efficient mobilizational criteria like the demand for group purity 
(group exclUSiveness) and the demandfor the ethnic/cultural cleavage to dominate 
over other types of social dimensions. Thus you might expect a tendency - from 
mobilizatioual reasons as well as from the fact of being excluded to join organizations 
as a part of the discrimination - to organize exclusively (within the ethnic/cultural 
group): schools, labour unions, social organizations will be group exclusive. 
Intentional unequal treatment will lead (not by logical necessity but by 
psychological probability) to the demand for retaliation, i.e. the acceptance of 
inequality in treatment of members of the originally discriminatory group and the 
result will be polarization of conflict. 
The group conflict tends to be cumulative . Your cultural or societal security 
And, of course, the more dominant and more encompassing that the discriminatory 
practices based upon cultural criteria are, the more clear and unequivocal will this 
perception of political life be. 
The expression 'the construction of political reality' is intentionally used to associate to 
'The Construction of Social Reality' by Berger-Ludemann. 
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interests' coalesce with your economic interests for a fair, reasonable part of the 
values and resources, in short the wealth of the society. This coincidence contributes 
to the intensity of conflict. Compromise is seen as a failure. According to this logic 
we get what in the literature is called a plural society. 'The characteristic expression 
of cultural pluralism takes the form of dissensus and conflict between segments which 
are based on ethnicity, religion, ideology, or regionalism on the basis of which 
important political structures, such as political parties, interest groups, and other 
voluntary associations are organized,9. 
The fully developed political world-view of a plural society thus has a strong affinity to 
the political world-view of traditional or neo-realist perceptions of the international 
political system: the collective units are the states to which rights are conferred or 
withdrawn, there is a traditional feeling of antagonism between the units, the individual 
is dependent upon his survival unit etc. It is the power resources of the states and the 
balance of power that determine the stability of the international political system. 
The difference between how the neo-realists perceive the international political 
reality and how the segments or groups of a plural society perceive their political reality, 
is of course that in a multicultural plural society there exists a political superstructure, a 
state. 
Political management of ethnic/cultural conflicts 
And, as we all know, the political system is not only an instrument that can be used to 
redress social wrongs, it can also be a direct part in discrimination or legalize oppressive 
practices. 
In a plural society with its practices of discrimination and the actual or potential 
conflicts between the cultural segments, the political system will not function in a stable 
way, unless it does try to handle cultural diversity through some institutional mechanisms. 
The aim of these is to minimize the risk that strife between the cultural groups spills over 
, 
9 
Societal security means to secure the survival of your own cultural community in its 
essential character under changing conditions , your traditional patterns of language, 
culture, religion and custom. 
J.Tindigarukayo: 'The viability of Federalism and Consociationalism in Cultural Plural 
Societies of Post-colonial states: A Theoretical Exploration', in Plural Societies, vol. 
XIX, No 1, September 1989, p.44. 
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into the political government and threatens the stability or even - through secession 
demands - the existence of the political system. 
According to the theory of consociational democracy, which has been developed 
specifically to explain the existence and paradoxical stability of politics in plural societies, 
the political mechanisms used are I) a high level of segmental autonomy, combined with 
2) elite cooperation in government, and 3) elite capacity to secure acceptance from the 
cultural segments. 
The theory of consociational democracy has been criticized by many both on account 
of its logical and its empirical inconsistenciesl •. According to some critic~l the whole 
explaining power of the theory hinges on the will by the elites to cooperate politically and 
not on the constitutional arrangements. And, of course, it is true that if there is no will by 
the elite or the majority of a cultural group to remain within the same political system or 
to accept the prevailing power balance, then the cooperative regime is likely to collapse. 
On the other hand, constitutional rules 'do matter' by raising the costs of non-compliance 
and by establishing explicit or implicit agreements to accept and maintain mutual 
political/legal guarantees to the different cultural groups. 
In the following, I would like to concentrate on the role of the political level to 
manage ethnic/cultural conflicts. These conflicts are transformed into political conflictsl2. 
Attempts to redress discrimination turn to the political system in the form of demands for 
political change, either in the form of policy-change or in the form of change in the 
political authority structure. 
One way to classify the political demands of ethno/cultural political groups and 
movements is to distinguish between 
a) Demands for changes in the political output, be they either economic demands for 
redistribution of economic means (like the location of a plant in the region) or cultural 
demands for the redress of cultural discrimination (like the implementation of legal anti-
discriminatory measures, e.g. affirmative action rules). 
b) Demands for constitutional change, to strengthen the competences and influence of the 
ethnic/cultural group within the political system (e.g. by changing rules of representation 
10 
II 
12 
Cf. the overview in Pappalardo, 1981. 
Cf. Barry 1975a and 1975b. 
In the case when there is not effective political authority to turn to , as in the examples 
of ex-Yugoslavia and ex-Soviet Union, the conflict as a result often develops into direct 
violent conflicts between the ethnic/cultural groups. 
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lil political institutions, changing decision-making rules, introduction of policy 
decentralization to a regional level) 
c) Demands for independence (secession). 
The actions or tactics used by ethnic/cultural movements can be classified along the 
dimension of violence/disobedience versus system-participation (playing according to the 
rules of the political game). The strategy may of course be a mixture of violent, extra-
political means and of participation through legal political actions like party representation 
in the central parliament, etc. 
Constitutional principles 
In the following we are going to focus upon demands for constitutional change, for 
institutional mechanisms, which are supposed to secure stability in plurally divided 
societies: 
It might be argued that the plural political system will be characterized by a low level 
of legitimacy and by political instability, as long as the political system is perceived to 
accept or further the discriminatory practices or be based upon a principle of political 
inequality. Of course, if the discriminated groups are very weak, in numbers, organization 
and economic and political capacity, the stability of the political system may be 
maintained: This case may be seen as a parallel to non-democratic systems, which may 
for long time periods suppress ethnic and cultural conflicts with the help of their 
repressive capabilities. 
The demands for constitutional change may be seen as expressions of two basic 
political principles: 
1) The principle of autonomy: the creation of ethnic/cultural group autonomy within 
certain policy-areas, creation of fmancial and legislative autonomy to directly elected 
regional or segmental assemblies. Two distinct autonomy unit types may thus be 
separated: territorial subunits with autonomy in certain areas and segmental, non-
territorial subunits. 'The major difference seems to lie in the fact that regional (territorial) 
units within a federal system may not necessarily coincide with cultural or social 
cleavages, while segments within a consociational system do so coincide' .13 
13 Tindigarukayo 1989, p. 49. 
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2) The principle of power-sharing in the form of joint decision-making, with 
constitutional guarantees for each group to be (equally or reasonably) represented in 
government and central adntinistration, e.g. adoption of proportionality formulae to 
leadership and employment opportunities in the bureaucracy or the military, and 
guarantees of decision-making influence in the form of veto-power or a permanent 
government grand coalition and/or guarantees of judicial review. 
The implementation of both these principles is necessary in order to establish a 
certain level of support for the political community and the political regime" in a 
culturally divided society. On the other hand, there seems to be a tension between the 
realization of these principles and the long-term stability of the political system: 
To the degree that the autonomy of the subunits can be upheld in some policy areas 
the risk of the introduction or continuation of discriminatory practices will be reduced in 
those areas. In the cultural policy field, e.g. language instruction and religious practices, 
this seems to be a stabilizing solution and in a way the rationale of the subunit autonomy. 
On the other hand, even cultural practices have an economic base and, as in other, more 
economic policy areas, the cultural segment autonomy may not positively change the 
material or economic poverty of the group population and the subsequent feeling of 
discrimination and injustice, when the position of one's own group or region is compared 
with other groups or regions within the same system. Thus, in order to function properly 
from a political stability point of view, the decision-making autonomy of the sub-units 
must in many cases be supplemented by a forceful redistributive capacity at the central 
political (i.e. federal or confederal) level. And at this level the constitutional guarantees 
for power-sharing create an opposite tendency, i.e. of weak decision-making capacity 
because of the 'joint decision-trap '15: In the case of hostility and tensions between the 
participating ethnic/cultural groups, strengthened by the political world- view, which has 
been generated and sustained through the processes of cultural discrimination, the central 
level will be more or less blocked as a result of the veto-powers distributed to the groups. 
This might renew the demands for other constitutional solutions or for outright secession. 
The question is whether there are countervailing motives making for cooperation in spite 
of a culturally divided political system. Such motives could be the economic advantages 
of cooperation within a political system or elite interests in the continuation of the 
traditional elite cooperation in order to fend off challenges from alternative elites. The will 
14 
15 
In the terminology used by David Easton. Cf. his A Systems Analysis of Political Life , 
1965, passim. 
Fritz W.Scharpf, 'The joint decision trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European 
Integration', Public Administration, Vol. 66, Autumn 1988, pp. 239-278 
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to cooperate will also in many cases be stronger in the face of a common enemy. There 
are numerous examples of multicultural political systems, being able to contain their 
tensions while fighting for independence or for the toppling of a non-democratic 
oppressive government, only to dissolve in intergroup fighting afterwards. In spite of such 
integrating factors, the disruptive force of the plural political world-view seems very 
strong. 'There may be a certain danger in a situation in which the only pennissible 
political pluralism is the ethnoterritorial one. Any grievance against the whole system may 
tend to be presented or disguised as basically ethnic rather than ideological, economic, 
social, or functional' 16. 
The probability oflonger term political stability will depend upon the changes in the 
definition of political reality, but the paradox or dilemma seems to be that the 
constitutional mechanisms, which are necessary in order to avoid open political conflict 
and the threat to the continuation and stability of the political system, at the same time 
contribute to cement the segmentation of political life along cultural cleavage lines and 
thus to conserve the political world-view of the plural society by defining the units as 
cultural groups and not individuals and thus reducing the possibilities for crosscutting 
identities and loyalties to emanate as political dimensions. By strengthening the cultural 
identity as political identity, constitutional 'appeasement' may not contribute to the long-
term stability of the political system. As long as the political world-view remains the 
same, and has the characteristics described above, the prognosis of the culturally plural 
political system seems very uncertain. 
16 [vo Duchacek, ComparaJive Federalism: An Agenda/or Additional Research, p.35 
14 
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